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AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS:
FINANCIAL DILEMMA FOR THE OLDER WORKER"
INTRODUCTION

Congress' passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) was an attempt to alleviate the harsh results of a dilemma that confronted older workers for decades.' Older employees who chose to retire often
experienced severe financial problems 2 due to the inadequacies of the Social
Security system 3 and the insufficiency of private savings. 4 These inadequacies
were intensified as employment beyond the normal retirement age was not a
viable alternative for many workers. These older individuals were the victims
of a variety of discriminatory practices including refusals to hire, denials of
promotions, and forced retirement. In addition, older workers who remained
*Editors'Note. This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in the winter 1981 quarter.
1. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, stat. 60 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. §§621-634 (1976)). As used throughout this note, the terms older worker, older
employee, or older individual are intended to refer, in a non-pejorative sense, to those individuals within the ADEA's protected class of employees from 40 to 70 years of age.
2. Despite over 130 federal programs which provide direct benefits to older individuals,
a considerable segment of the retirement-age population has, until fairly recently, remained
outside the scope of congressional attention. See HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, TEAMwORK
IN THE DELIVERY OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS TO THE ELDERLY, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 1

(Comm. Pub.

No. 96-227 1980).
The magnitude of these federal programs is demonstrated by an Office of Management
and Budget estimate that approximately $155 billion, or 25% of the 1981 executive budget
proposals, consisted of program benefits to older individuals. To further exemplify the
dimensions of these programs, appropriations for the Older Americans Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-73, 79 Stat. 218 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§3001-3057(g) (1980)), have increased from
$6,500,000 in fiscal year 1966 to over $1 billion in fiscal year 1980. In combination with Social
Security, Medicare, and various federal pension and annuity funds, the Older Americans Act
constitutes the basic source of federal benefits designed specifically for the elderly. Id. See
generally Pepper, An Improved Lifestyle for the Elderly, 55 FLA. B.J. 178 (1981), for a discussion of various federal programs which aid older citizens, with an emphasis on the Florida
situation.

3. The Social Security Act of 1935 was the first American legislative program designed to
compensate for the loss of earning power experienced upon retirement. Social Security Act of
1935, 42 U.S.C. §§301-1396(i) (1976).
Nearly every country in the world now has some form of social insurance plan. A report
published in 1974 by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare listed 105 different countries which maintain social insurance plans for old age, disability and survivors'
benefits. See W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 242 (1976) citing
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, RESEARCH

REPORT No. 44, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 1973, at xi (1974).
4. See R. CLARK, THE ROLE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS IN MAINTAINING LIVING STANDARDS IN
RETIREMENT 8-10 (1977). "If a worker were forced to rely on personal savings alone, the
magnitude of the savings rates he would have to attain to provide adequate retirment income is quite impressive, and perhaps it is even beyond the reach of many U.S. families." Id.
SECURITY, TODAY AND TOMORROW 92 (1978). (earnings on savings are generally not sufficient to add greatly to retirement income); J. BARRO, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE SAVINGS: ANOTHER LOOK, 42 Soc. SEC. BULL. 33 (1979).

at 9. See also R. BALL, SOCIAL
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on the job often received lower salaries and benefits than younger workers with

the same job. ADEA was designed to rectify these problems and to assure
equitable treatment of workers regardless of age. 5
A major purpose of the Act and its subsequent amendments6 was to regulate
retirement and pension plans and to oversee the delivery of accompanying plan
benefits. Private pension plans had become increasingly relied upon as a source
of income maintenance for retirees, due in great part to the insufficiency of the
Social Security system." Although private sponsorship of pensions has never
5. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 60
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § §621-634 (1976).
6. The ADEA has been amended twice. The Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §201-19 (1976)), added a new section to
the ADEA which made unlawful any discrimination on account of age in federal government
employment. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §621-34 (1978)) extended the protection of the Act
to cover employees between the ages of 40 and 70. Exemptions to the extended age limitation
were made for tenured college faculty and managerial or highly compensated personnel. Two
procedural changes were also made. The amendments eliminated the notice of intent to sue
requirement and added a provision for tolling the statute of limitations during conciliation.
Most importantly, the amendments clarified the bona fide employee benefit plan exception
by specifically outlawing mandatory retirement before age 70.
7. Since its inception, the Social Security system has been maligned as a costly, ineffective,
and unreliable means of providing federal benefits. However, a recent report by the Social
Security Advisory Council bolstered confidence in the system with its conclusion that all current and future beneficiaries would be able to count on receiving the benefits to which they
are entitled, provided taxes are revised. See REPORT OF Ta 1979 SOCA SEcuarrY ADvisoRY
CouNcIL-ExEcUTIvE SuMMrARY, reprinted in Oversight on Recommendations of 1979 Social
Security Advisory Council, Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Retirement Income and
Employment of the Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1980).
To encourage system stability, the report recommends integrating earmarked portions of
personal and corporate income taxes into the system in lieu of increasing payroll taxes. It
also endorsed the making of payments to the various trust funds from general revenues or
borrowing among funds as ways of increasing flexibility of the system and thus protecting it
against economic fluctuation. Id.
See also CoMMERCE CLEARING HousE, INc., 1978 SoCAL SEcUTrrY AND MEDICARE EXPLAINED
21-22 (1978) for further explanation of the mechanics of the Social Security system. The old
age, survivors, and disability insurance system and hospital insurance benefits for the aged
and disabled (OASDHI), are largely financed out of taxes paid by employers, employees, and
the self-employed under the provisions of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the
Self-Employment Contribution Act. These taxes are collected by the Internal Revenue Service
and are paid into the United States Treasury as internal revenue collections.
See also Social Security Administration, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare,
Social Security in Review, Soc. SEC. BULL. no. 12, at 1 (1979). In August, 1979, the system paid
about $9 billion in monthly cash benefits to 34.8 million people, including the retired and
disabled, their dependents, widows, widowers, and children of deceased workers. Id.
For a complete breakdown of the categories of benefits and the amounts paid to each,
see id. at 1-2. The average monthly benefit for retired workers was $292.55; for disabled
workers, $320.95; for aged widows and widowers, $265.95; and for children of deceased workers, $203A2. Id.
Social Security payments are generally xecognized as an insufficient single source of income,
See, e.g., G. TOLLEY & R. BuRmHAUsER, INCOME SUPPORT POLICIES FOR THE AGED 133-49 (1977).
But see R. CLARK, THE ROLE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS IN MAINTAINING LIVING STANDARDS IN RETmRMENT vi (1977).
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been mandated by law," these programs are in effect subsidized by the government in the form of preferential tax treatment to encourage coverage of the
private labor forceY Recently, private pension regulation underwent substantial
reform under the auspices of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA). 10 That act dealt with the technical aspects of pension law,
including specific funding, vesting, and accrual requirements for plan sponsors.
Although ERISA was the most comprehensive statute to deal with pensions,
provisions of ADEA relating to retirement and pension plans highlighted problems not specifically addressed by ERISA. ERISA focused on the structural
aspects of plan design, while the ADEA directed itself to the equities involved
in providing employees with the benefits generated by their plan participation.
Pension practices such as mandatory retirementl and age-based benefit reductions12 were sought to be curtailed by ADEA because of the threat posed to an
8. The first formal private pension plan was developed in 1875 by the American Express
Company to provide benefits to its disabled, elderly employees. Benefits were available only
to permanently incapacitated workers over 60 years of age who had served the company for at
least 20 years. See W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, supra note 3, at 27-35.
Over three-fourths of the 397 pension plans established between 1875 and 1929 were noncontributory. These early plans were usually paid out of an employer's current earnings as a
current business expense. By the early 1920's, however, many plans had been turned into
trusts to take greater advantage of favorable tax provisions. Such plans immediately ignited a
controversy as to their proper tax treatment. In 1926, pension trusts created by employers
solely to benefit their employees were exempted from federal income tax. Employer contributions to, and the income derived from, these trusts were not taxable to the beneficiaries until
actually distributed. Increasingly complex additions were made to the growing body of
pension law, both in the Internal Revenue Code and within the provisions of various statutes.
The epitome of complexity in pension regulation was subsequently reached with the passage
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§1001-1381 (1976)). See W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, supra note 3, at 59-67.
All of the legislation dealing with pension regulation, however, has been designed with regard to the employer's option of discontinuing the plan. The complexity of the area is thus
partly a response to the difficulty of balancing the rights of employees and the prerogatives
of employers.
9. See I.R.C. §404, which provides for a deduction for contributions by an employer to
an employee's trust, pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or annuity plan.
10. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§1001-1381 (1976)). ERISA was a response to various forces within the
pension field which were all pressing for a comprehensive reform of the system. The expectations of many employees were (lashed when several major industry shutdowns occurred in
the mid-1960's. Reform recommendations and other pension legislation were introduced into
Congress. What eventually resulted in 1974 was the 208-page statute known as the Pension
Reform Act or ERISA. The passage of the Act denoted a shift in public policy regarding
private pensions from a tax-based orientation to one more focused on employee security. See
W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, supra note 3, at 66-67.
ERISA established new basic requirements in almost every area of pension administration
and funding. It set rules for employee participation in pension plans requiring employers to
allow an employee to participate if he has worked the requisite one year. 29 U.S.C. §1052
(1976). It established standards for "vesting" of an employee's plan benefits which meant that
his rights to those benefits became nonforfeitable after a certain time period. Id. §1053. It
defined the proper funding calculations for an employer's pension plan and set limitations
on benefits and contributions. Id. §§1081-1086. It imposed strict fiduciary obligations upon
plan sponsors, including complex reporting and disclosure requirements. Id. §§1021-1031,
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individual's ability to maintain an adequate standard of living after retirement. These very practices, however, were permitted by various provisions of
ERISA.'3 Unfortunately, regulations promulgated to remedy conflicting interpretations of the two statutes have instead resulted in additional confusion and
uncertainty.
This note will examine the ADEA in its original and amended forms to
determine whether the option of post-retirement-age employment is really a
viable one today. It will also analyze the regulations promulgated under the
Act and examine their consistency with the goals of the Act itself. Finally, it
will offer proposals to reconcile these internal conflicts so as to promote equitable treatment of the employee without placing an undue burden on the employer.
AGE DIsmimiNATioN LEGIsLA-noN

In response to mounting public sentiment against discriminatory employment practices,' 4 Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967.15 Aided by a Labor Department report and the results of extensive public hearings and studies,16
1101-1114. Finally, the Act created the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), an
independent, non-profit plan termination insurance company. All plans covered by the Act
are now required to pay insurance premiums to the PBGO for termination coverage. Id.

§§1301-1381 (1976).
For more complete examinations of ERISA, its effects, and its implications, see generally
R. BImDERsEE, PENSION REGULATION MANUAL (rev. ed. 1979); N. LEVIN, ERISA AND LABORMANAGEMENT BENEITr FUNDS (2d rev. ed. 1975); D. LOGUE, LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE ON CORPO-

PLANS (1979); J. MAMORsKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw, ERISA AND BEYOND
(1980); PRACrICING LAW INSTITUTE, INTRODUCTION TO QUALIFIED PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING
PLANS (1979).
11. See 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (1976). The term mandatory retirement as used throughout
this note signifies the policy of requiring termination of employment upon the attainment of
a specified age. Such retirement is based upon age alone and has nothing to do with the
employee's ability. The age of 65 is generally recognized as the normal retirement age. See
29 U.S.C. §1002(24) (1975). See generally J. WALKER, THE END OF MANDATORY RETIREMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT (1978).
12. See Costs and Benefits Under Employee Benefit Plans, 29 C.F.R. §860.120(a)(1) (1980).
This terminology reflects the practice of reducing the level of various employee benefits, such
as life insurance or disability coverage, to account for the increased cost of providing such
benefits to older workers. Id.
13. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §1052(a)(2) (1976), which under certain circumstances permits the
RATE PENSION

exclusion of employees from plan participation on the basis of age.

14. See generally Hearings on Proposed Age Discrimination in Employment Legislation
Before the House GeneralSubcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as ADEA Hearings]. Testimony of various individuals and organizations reflected strong public disfavor with the employment situation of
older individuals. See generally Note, Age Discriminationin Employment: The Problem of the
Older Worker, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1966). (complete analysis of the factors leading up to
passage of the initial age discrimination legislation).
15. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 60
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§621-634 (1976)).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-3, 2-3, reprinted in [1967] US. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEvs 2213, 2214-15 [hereinafter cited as House Report]. The House General
Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor began public hearings
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Congress concluded that adoption of a comprehensive program to combat age
discrimination was required. 17 The ADEA reflects a national policy favoring
the promotion of the rights of older workers by basing employment opportunities on ability rather than age. The scope and magnitude of the Act are
far-reaching. More than sixty-four million people are employed by over one
million employers subject to the ADEA provisions.18 Data compiled by the
Labor Department indicate that thirty-seven million workers were within the
forty to sixty-five year old protected age class in 1975.19
In language identical to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 20 the ADEA
expressly provides for elimination of age discrimination against workers between the ages of forty and sixty-five in all terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment. 21 The Act applies to employers of over twenty workers, labor
organizations, and employment agencies.22 Specific exemptions permitted actions that adversely affect older employees so long as they are based on one of
four factors: 1) age is a bona fide occupational qualification essential to job
performance; 23 2) factors other than age could reasonably be shown to justify
on the original age discrimination proposal on August 1, 1967. See ADEA HEARINcS, supra
note 14, at 1. During the six days of testimony, the subcommittee heard from 16 witnesses and
received statements from various interested parties. The subcommittee also discussed a study
conducted by the Labor Department which recommended statutory action to end age discrimination in employment. This study eventually resulted in an administrative proposal to
Congress, H.R. 4221, which was amended into a clean bill, H.R. 13054, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), and subsequently ordered reported favorably out of the Committee on Education and

Labor. See also

SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN

WORKER - AGE DISCRIMINATION

17.

(1965).
See 29 U.S.C. §621 (1976).

18.

See EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINA-

IN EMPLOYMENT

ACT OF 1967: REPORT COVERING ACTIVITES UNDER THE ACT DURING 1974,
17 (1975).
19. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)-(c) (1976).
21. See 29 U.S.C. §623(a)-(e) (1976). The language of the ADEA is identical to the corresponding sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, except that the words "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin" were replaced by "age." Accord, Rogers v. Exxon Research
& Eng'r. Co., 11 FEP Cases 776 (D.N.J. 1975) ("The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1976 may be profitably compared with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in both
purpose and scope").
22. See 29 U.S.C. §623(a)-(c) (1976).
23. Id. (f)(1). See 29 C.F.R. §860.102 (1980). These regulations promulgated by the Labor
Department attempt to define a "bona fide occupational qualification." Whether the qualification is indeed bona fide will be determined "on the basis of all the pertinent facts surrounding each particular situation." Id. §860.102(b). The regulations also provide that this exception is to be construed narrowly, with the burden of proof on the party invoking it. Id. An
example of a permissible bona fide occupational qualification, according to the regulations,
would be "a federal statutory [or] regulatory requirement which provide[s] compulsory age
limitations for hiring or compulsory retirement, without reference to the individual's actual
physical condition at the terminal age, when such conditions are clearly imposed for the
safety and convenience of the public." Id. §860.102(d). An example of a valid bona fide occupational requirement would be the compulsory retirement of airline pilots within the
jurisdiction of the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA). FAA regulations do not permit airline
pilots to engage in carrier operations as pilots after reaching age 60. Id. Cf. Massachusetts Bd.
of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). In reviewing a Massachusetts statute mandating the
TION IN EMPLOYMENT
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different treatment of older workers; 24 3) terms of bona fide seniority systems
or employee benefit plans expressly provide for such treatment; 25 and 4) the
26
employer's action was for good cause.
LITIGATION OF AGE DISCRIMINATION ISSUES

As with any new legislation, the initial burden of defining the ADEA's
scope fell to the courts. Early judicial interpretation often relied upon the
precedent of Title VII discrimination cases for aid in determining such issues
as burden of proof 27 and preliminary statutory construction.2s Although this
retirement of state police officers at age 50, the Court employed a rationality test as the
standard of review for an equal protection claim of age discrimination. The Court determined
that the statute was rationally related to the state's legitimate objective of protecting the
public by assuring the physical preparedness of its police force. Id. at 314. This decision has
been criticized for its relegation of age discrimination claims to the weakest equal protection
standard, the rationality test. See generally Abramson, Compulsory Retirement, The Constitution, and the Murgia Case, 42 Mo. L. REv. 25 (1977); Comment, Forced Retirement
Affirmed: Is the Supreme Court Sanctioning Age Discrimination?,23 Loy. L. Rxv. 251 (1977);
Comment, The Burger Court's "Newest" Equal Protection: Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine Rejected - Two-Tier Review Reinstated, 1977 WAsH. U. L.Q. 140.
24. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(1) (1976). See 29 C.F.R. §860.103 (1979). The regulations are not as
helpful in defining what such "reasonable factors" might be. Analysis of the reasons offered
by employers will be on an individual, case-by-case basis. The regulations, however, do list
certain factors which may be recognized as supporting a differentiation based on reasonable
factors other than age. For example, physical fitness requirements based upon pre-employment
or periodic physical examinations relating to minimum standards for employment could
generally qualify for the exception. These standards, however, must be reasonably necessary
for the specific work to be performed and must be uniformly applied to all applicants for
the particular job category, regardless of age. Additionally, evaluation factors such as
quantity or quality of production, or educational level, would be acceptable grounds for
differentiation when such factors are shown to have a valid relationship to job requirements
and are applied equally to all employees. See also Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320 F. Supp.
1175, 1182 (W.D. Ark. 1970) (layoffs of a number of selected employees found to be based on
reasonable factors other than age, because defendant-employer had established a valid plan
for carefully evaluating employees individually so that those retained would be the most
capable and competent).
25. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (1976). See notes 57-118 infra.
26. 29 U.S.C. §623(f(3) (1976). Apparently this section was deemed to be unambiguous as
no regulations were promulgated by the Labor Department to interpret it.
For a more complete discussion of all of the exceptions to the ADEA, see generally Player,
Defense Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Misinterpretation,Misdirection,
and the 1978 Amendments, 12 GA. L. REv. 747 (1978).
27. See, e.g., Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 310 (6th Cir. 1975) (cases arising
under ADEA subject to a greater burden of proof than in Title VII actions); Hodgson v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 1972) (burden of proof in age discrimination suit identical to any other discrimination area). Cf. Muniz v. Beto, 434 F.2d 697,
700-01 (5th Cir. 1970) (Mexican-American seeking review of habeas corpus proceeding could
establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of grand jury by showing a
disparity between the percentage which his race constitutes of the group of persons from
whom a jury list is drawn and the percentage which his race constitutes of the jury list
which is thereafter compiled).
28. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div. of Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.
1974) (discharge of employee after 33 years of service deemed unlawful under ADEA);
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volume of litigation construing the ADEA's general prohibitions was significant, interpretation of the exemption provisions29 was more prodigious in
both amount and controversy.
One often litigated provision 3° was section 4(f)(2)'s bona fide retirement
plan exemption. 31 That provision condoned disparate treatment of older employees in allocation of benefits if conducted pursuant to a bona fide seniority
system or employee benefit plan.3 2 A bona fide plan was defined as one whose
terms were explained to employees in writing and which provided benefits in
33
accordance with its terms.
Conflict arose when many plan sponsors assumed that the exemption provision left intact the option of forced retirement even if practiced upon individuals within the Act's protected age group. This conclusion was not unreasonable in light of the statutory language which permitted sponsors of
pension plans to observe the terms of bona fide plans.34 Section 4(f)(2) expressly stated that a bona fide plan not established as a "subterfuge to evade
the Act's purposes" could lawfully contain terms that effectively discriminated
on the basis of age. 35 Employees who were involuntarily retired under plans
Brennan v. Reynolds & Co., 367 1'. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (employer granted summary judgment under ADEA because firing was due to employee's habitual tardiness, not
age); Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (employee's evidence
of decline of average age of employer's sales managers and comments of employer indicating
desire to hire younger people sufficient to sustain prima facie case of unlawful discrimination
under ADEA). See also C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, FEDERAL AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW 91-97 (1978); Calille, Three Developing Issues of the Federal Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967, 54 U. DEm. J. URB. L. 431, 437-459 (1977).
29. See 29 U.S.C. §623(f) (1976).
30. See, e.g., deLoraine v. MEBA Pension Trust, 499 F.2d 49, 50 (2d Cir. 1974) (pension
plan provision mandating marine engineer's retirement was within the section 4(f)(2) exception to the ADEA even though employee had been reinstated after previously retiring
voluntarily); Steiner v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 377 F. Supp. 945, 947
(C.D. Cal. 1974) (baseball umpire's forced retirement pursuant to a retirement income plan
was valid even where the option of allowing deferred retirement was available to the employer and was totally discretionary); Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368 F. Supp. 364, 367 (E.D.
Tenn. 1973) (employee's termination valid as a reduction in force despite claims that it was
based on arbitrary age discrimination).
31. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (arguing for reversal); Anici Curiae
Brief for the Nat'l Retired Teachers Ass'n, et al., United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192
(1977) (arguing for affirmance).
32. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (1976).
33. 29 C.F.R. §860.120(b) (1979).
34. See 19 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (1976). In addition to the statutory language, support for this
conclusion was readily available within the legislative history. See, e.g., House Report, supra
note 16, at 5. "It is important to note that exception (3) [referring to 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2)
(1976)] applies to new and existing employee benefit plans, and to both the establishment and
maintenance of such plans. This exception serves to emphasize the primary purpose of the
bill - hiring of older workers - by permitting employment without necessarily including such
workers in employee benefit plans." Id.
35. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (1976). The section states that activities which might be unlawful under other provisions of the ADEA are permissible if conducted in observance of a
"bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan." Id. See 29 C.F.R.
§860.120(b) (1979).
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incorporating such terms challenged this interpretation and sought clarification of the actual legislative intent. Rather than providing clarification, however, the resulting litigation produced a conflict among the circuit courts as to
the proper construction of section 4(f)(2).
The first interpretation of the exemption provision was the 1974 Fifth
Circuit decision Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co.36 The issue in that case was
whether a profit-sharing plan's mandatory retirement provision which predated enactment of the ADEA qualified for the section 4(f)(2) exemption." To
resolve this question, the court adopted a chronological approach based on a
literal reading of statutory language. 38 The court reasoned that a plan in existence prior to passage of the Act met the exemption's bona fide requirements
because such a plan could not have been designed as a subterfuge to evade the
purpose of the Act.P9
The Fourth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in McMann v. United
Airlines.40 In contrast to Taft Broadcasting,the court in McMann looked to
the ADEA's legislative history for the proper interpretation of section 4(f)(2).
The court concluded that Congress had not intended to permit mandatory
retirement on the basis of age alone, despite the existence of the exemption

36. 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974). This was the first case to present the question of
whether a profit-sharing plan with a mandatory retirement clause was an unlawful evasion
of the ADEA. The plaintiff-employee was a sixty-year-old technical supervisor who had been
employed by the defendant-employer for nineteen years. Id. at 214.
37. Id. at 215. The court noted that, "Taft's 'Plan' was instituted in 1963. [The plaintiff]
exercised his option to participate in 1963. The Act was approved December 15, 1967. Quite
obviously, Congress sought to avoid legal and constitutional problems likely to arise from any
ex post facto effort to invalidate existing employee benefit plans." Id.
38. The court rejected the employee's legislative history argument that the purpose in
enacting section 4(f(2) was to protect employers from increased costs of maintaining benefit
plans. Id. at 216-17. Instead, the court cited Braunstein v. Commissioner, 347 U.S. 65 (1963),
for the proposition that it is "improper to consider Congressional purpose when the meaning
of a statute is plain." Additionally, the court noted the practical difficulty of analyzing congressional purpose on a case-by-case basis. Its final reason for rejecting the plaintiff's reliance
on legislative history was its belief that statutory language should serve the funtion of indicating prohibited conduct. Continual reference to legislative history mitigates against this
function. 500 F.2d at 217.
39. 500 F.2d at 215. The court stated only that the plan was effectuated far in advance
of the enactment of the law, eliminating any notion that it was adopted as a subterfuge for
evasion. Id. Other courts have used the same chronological approach in construing the subterfuge language of section 4(f)(2). See, e.g., Jensen v. Gulf Oil Refining & Marketing Co., 623
F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1980) (mandatory retirement provision of employee benefit plan valid
because plan had been in effect continuously since its establishment in 1944 and thus could
not be a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA); Alford v. City of Lubbock, 484
F. Supp. 1001, 1005 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (Texas Municipal Retirement System's provision mandating retirement at age 65 not a subterfuge to evade the ADEA as it was created in 1947,
well before the enactment of the ADEA).
40. 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976). The plaintiff was hired by United Airlines in 1944 and
served in various capacities, most recently as a "Technical-Spedalist- Aircraft Systems." Id.
at 218-19. His duties did not involve flying airplanes, but were managerial in nature. Id. at
219 n.3. Cf. 29 C.F.R. §860.102(d) (1979) (airline pilots within the jurisdiction of the Federal
Aviation. Agency are not permitted to perform as pilots after age 60).
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provision. 41 Instead, for any plan to qualify for the exemption, reasons other
than age must be demonstrated as justification for a mandatory retirement
provision.42 This broke new ground in the applicability of the exemption, as
the necessity for such evidence was never considered in Taft Broadcasting.The
McMann court suggested that proof of economic or business purpose was necessary to override the otherwise unlawful provision.43 Thus McMann stood for
the proposition that section 4(f)(2) was not intended to authorize involuntary
retirement before age sixty-five, but instead was only intended to make the
hiring of older employees more economically feasible by condoning the provision of lesser benefits for them.
In Zinger v. Blanchette, 44 the Third Circuit approached section 4(f)(2)
from a new perspective. Although a legislative history analysis similar to that
in McMann was employed, the Zinger court interpreted the exemption as a
congressional response to concern for the financial situation of the retired employee. 45 According to this reasoning, the ADEA covered only discriminatory
discharges and was not intended to forbid mandatory retirement provisions
when they are part of a valid plan which paid out adequate benefits.16 Because
41. 542 F.2d at 221. The court did not dispute the validity of a plan which requires retirement where exclusion is justified by economic considerations, however. Id. See note 43
infra.
42. 542 F.2d at 220. According to the court's analysis, a different reading of the exception
would "produce the absurd result that an employer could discharge an employee pursuant to
a retirement plan for no reason other than age, but then could not refuse to hire the presumptively otherwise-qualified individual, for 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) explicitly provides that 'no
such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual . . . '." Id.

43. Id. The court further stated that "Congress did not intend retirement plan provisions ever to excuse the failure to hire or the discharge of any individual, but only to permit exclusion of some workers from the plan on the basis of age where exclusion is justified
by economic consideration." Id. at 221 (emphasis in original). In reaching this conclusion
the court turned to the same legislative history which had been glossed over in Taft Broadcasting.
44. 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977). Zinger involved a sixty-four year old employee of the
Penn Central Railroad who had been involuntarily retired pursuant to his employer's pension plan. The employee claimed that the employer's action was not protected by the section
4(f)(2) exemption, because the agreement under which it was carried out was contrary to the
provisions of the original plan. Id. at 902-03. The employee's major contention, however, was
that involuntary retirement in and of itself, was impermissible. Id. at 904-05.
45. This conclusion was based at least in part on an interpretative bulletin issued by a
former Secretary of Labor which the court construed as differentiating between retirement
with and without a pension. The latter would have the same financial effect as a discharge.
Id. at 907-08. The court stated that "[W]hile discharge without compensation is obviously
undesirable, retirement on an adequate pension is generally regarded with favor." Id. (citing
to Hearings on Early Retirement and Related Subjects Before the Subcom. on Retirement and
the Individual of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1967) and
Note, Mandatory Retirement: The Law, the Courts, and the Broader Social Context, 11
WiLLAMmETE LJ. 398 (1975)).

46. 549 F.2d at 905. "While discharge without compensation is obviously undesirable, retirement on an adequate pension is generally regarded with favor." Id. (citing to Hearings
on Early Retirement and Related Subjects Before the Subcom. on Retirement and the individual of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1967) and Note,
Mandatory Retirement: The Law, the Courts, and the Broader Social Context, 11 WMILAME'r
L.J. 398 (1975)).
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the plan at issue did pay substantial benefits, the court concluded that it came
within the purview of the exemption.4 7 The court's holding, however, went
beyond this conclusion to condone a bona fide plan which either required or
permitted retirement prior to age sixty-five at the employer's option.48
These conflicting interpretations were temporarily settled by the Supreme
Court's review of the McMann decision.49 Upon reasoning almost identical to
that used in the Taft Broadcastingcase, the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit
and held that the section 4(f)(2) exemption did not prohibit mandatory retirement pursuant to a bona fide pension plan.50 Although the Court's decision
47. 549 F.2d at 909. This sufficiency of benefits argument postulates that insofar as a retirement or pension plan pays out benefits of a sizable amount it will not be deemed a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA. It has been used successfully to demonstrate a
plan's authenticity. See, e.g., Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 461 F. Supp. 362, 374 (D. Md.
1978) (railroad retirement plan which had been in existence for over 25 years and had paid
substantial benefits to retired employees was valid under ADEA); McKinley v. Bendix Corp.,
420 F. Supp. 1001, 1003 (WD. Miss. 1976) (plaintiff who received substantial retirement benefits under company plan could not claim it was not a bona fide pension plan under the
ADEA).
48. 549 F.2d at 910. This determination appears antithetical to the language of the Act
and has in fact been the basis for opposite holdings in other courts. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1978) (mandatory retirement provision valid
under ADEA because retirement was required by the plan and was not optional with the
employer); Hannan v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 443 F. Supp. 802, 804 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (although retirement plan was bona fide in that it predated the ADEA and paid substantial
benefits, it did not fall under the Act's exemption because it did not always strictly observe
the terms of the plan which resulted in unlawful optional retirements). But see, e.g., Marshall
v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 575 F.2d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 1978) (mandatory retirement provision
valid although permitting employer to exercise option of retiring employees even where the
plan does not require those retirements). The reason is that section 4(f)(2) grants an exemption only when the retirement action is taken in accordance with the terms of a bona fide
plan. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (1976). When retirement is dictated by the employer, it cannot
logically be argued that the retirement is mandated by the requirements of a valid plan.
49. United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
50. Id. at 203-04. The Court refuted the proposition that section 4(f)(2) was only intended as an economic incentive to encourage hiring of older workers. Instead, the Court
found that the true intent of the provision was to protect the employer's right to require presixty-five retirement pursuant to a valid plan. Id. at 200-01. To support this contention, the
Court turned to the legislative history to demonstrate the absence of congressional intent to
undermine retirement plans existing when the Act was passed. Id. See Hearings on S.830
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1967) (statement of Willard Wirtz) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
Senator Javits recognized a potential problem in the administration of section 4(f)(2). In the
debate on the legislation he noted that the exemption "[did] not provide any flexibility in
the amount of pension benefits paid to older workers depending on their age when hired,
and thus may actually encourage employers, faced with the necessity of paying greatly increased premiums, to look for excuses not to hire older workers." Id. at 27.
At least one of the Court's legislative history examples, however, bears a very attenuated
relationship to the conclusion it was meant to support. Specifically, the Court pointed to the
dialogue between the minority and majority managers of the bill which eventually became
the ADEA. Their discussion involved a clarification of the exemption's effect on existing
plans. Rather than supporting the Court's statement that pre-age-65 retirements were protected, it actually sustained the plaintiffs argument that the exemption was more of an
economic concession to employes_ Thg dissent also noted the discrepancy in the Court's
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appeared to be a windfall for proponents of mandatory retirement,5 1 Congress
explicitly overruled it52 less than four months later through enactment of the
1978 amendments to the ADEA.53
THE 1978 AMENDMENTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON BENEFIT PRACTICES

The primary purpose of the 1978 amendments was to strengthen and
broaden the ADEA to assure equal employment opportunities for older workers. 54 The steps implemented. to achieve this goal included raising the upper
age limit from sixty-five to seventy-five years55 and instituting procedural
changes to facilitate the filing of suits under the Act.56 The most significant
analysis. 434 U.S. at 215 n.9. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the Court adopted the
chronological test applied in Taft Broadcasting. Its holding, therefore, was that a bona fide
plan predating the ADEA's enactment could not be a subterfuge for evading the Act and
thus by its terms could permissibly require involuntary retirement. Id. at 203.
51. By citing Taft Broadcasting with approval and expressly reversing the Fourth
Circuit's decision, the Court in effect validated all pre-Act bona fide retirement plans.
52. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 528, 529 [hereinafter cited as House Conf. Report]. This report clearly
stated congressional motive for the 1978 amendment to section 4(f)(2): "The conferees specifically disagree with the Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in [the McMann] case.
Plan provisions in effect prior to the date of enactment are not exempt under section 4(f)(2)
by virtue of the fact that they antedate the act or these amendments." Id.
See also S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 504, 513 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. The Senate position on the
amendment was equally clear: "The amendment to section 4(0(2) serves to express congressional approval of the result reached by the Fourth Circuit in McMann." Id.
53. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
92 Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. §631 (1976)).
54. See Senate Report, supra note 52, at 1. See generally Note, Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Amendments of 1978: A Questionable Expansion, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 767,
768 (1978); Note, Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Pension Plan Exception After McMann and the 1978 Amendments, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 323, 323 (1978); Note,
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 85, 86 (1979).
The purpose of the amendments was to assure that the courts would reach the merits of
the cases more often, and that they would do so expeditiously. Senate Report, supra note 52,
at 12.
Consideration of the many issues involved in the procedure for enforcement of the ADEA
is outside the scope of this note. For in-depth analysis of these questions, see generally
Sheeder, Procedural Complexity of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: An Age-Old
Problem, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 241 (1980); Note, The Procedural Requirements of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 9 RTJT.-CAM.. L.J. 540 (1978); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Procedural and Substantive Issues in the Aftermath of the
1978 Amendments, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 665 (1979).
55. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95256, 92 Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. §631 (1976)).
56. Id. §4 (amending 29 U.S.C. §§626(c)-(e) (1976). There were two basic procedural
changes made. First, the 180-day notice of intent to sue which was required to be filed with
the Secretary of Labor was eliminated from section 7(d) of the Act. This requirement had
created many problems of interpretation. As stated in the Senate Report, supra note 52, at
12, "failure to timely file the notice as required by section 7(d) [had] been the most common
basis for dismissal of ADEA law suits by private individuals. The 180-day limit [had] been
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aspect of the amendments, however, was the clarification of section 4(f)(2). " In

unambiguous language, the amendment prohibited any plan provision which
would require or permit mandatory retirement due to age of any individual protected by the Act.58 The Senate report0 9 described the legislative
position as a complete rejection of the notion of mandatory retirement. 0

Despite this stated position against involuntary retirement, Congress still
intended to allow employers some flexibility in providing pension benefits to
older workers. 61 Passage of the amendments, however, limited the availability
of such options for the plan sponsor. Consequently, considerable research has
been generatedG2 regarding current employer benefit practices and the preliminary adjustments anticipated or made in their plans to assure compliance
with the ADEA. One survey 63 concluded that a clear majority of the responding
companies were employing techniques designed to discourage their older employees from deferring retirement. 64 In many instances, corporate policy diinterpreted as jurisdictional by some courts, and consequently complaints [were] dismissed"
(citing Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975); Hiscott v. General Elec. Co.,
521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1974)). See generally Comment, Age Discrimination-Notice -Filing Notice of Intent to Sue
Within 180 Days After the Alleged Violation is a JurisdictionalPrerequisite to an Action
Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 45 U. CiN. L. REv. 123 (1976).
The second procedural amendment involved the tolling of the Act's statute of limitations
during the conciliation period required by section 7(b). The Senate Report, supra note 52, at
13, once again expressed congressional dissatisfaction with judicial interpretation of the requirement: "various courts have held that the failure to comply with the conciliation requirement in section 7(b) requires dismissal of the lawsuit. Some courts have gone so far as to say
that conciliation is a 'jurisdictional prerequisite' to bringing a lawsuit under the Act." (citing
Dunlop v. Resource Sciences Corp., 410 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Okla. 1976); Usery v. Sun Oil Co.,
423 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
Additionally, new exemptions for executive or high policy-making positions and tenured
college and university faculty were added. Pub. L. No. 95-256, §3, 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §631 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979)).
57. Pub. L. No. 95-256, §2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978). The amendment added the following
language to section 4(f)(2) of the original ADEA: "and no such seniority system or employee
benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified
by section 12(a) of this Act because of the age of such individual." Clearly, mandatory retirement pursuant to a pension or benefit plan was deemed unlawful. Compare with the
original language of the Act, note 29 supra.
58. Pub. L. No. 95-256, §2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
59. See Senate Report, supra note 52.
60. "In the [Senate Human Resources] committee's view, forced retirement extinguishes
an individual's right to employment and is thus not excused by section 4(f)(2) unless the
retirement is based on some reason other than age, such as disability or poor performance."
Id. at 10. "The committee believes that the arguments for retaining existing mandatory retirement policies are largely based on misconceptions rather than upon a careful analysis of
the fact." Id. at 4.
61. See, e.g., House Report, supra note 16, at 5.
62. See generally JOHNSON & HicGINs, A SURVEY ON THE EFmcTs o, THE 1978 AMENDMENTS
TO THE AGE DLsCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT Aar (1980); C. SPENCER & AssocIATES, SURVEY ON
CORPORATE RESPONSE TO THE ADEA (1979).
63. See JOHNSON &HiGmINs, supra note

Business Insurance, May 19, 1980, at 56, col. 1.
62.

64. Id. at 5. The report accompanying the- survey results cited one finding that about
61% of the 85 companies participating followed the policy of freezing retirement and other
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rected that benefits under the various plans be frozen when the employee
reaches age sixty-five.65 Other companies chose not to credit service, salary increases, or benefit improvements after age sixty-five for purposes of calculating
the final deferred retirement. benefit. 66
The entire area of pension and retirement benefits for the older employee
is of increasing concern to the employer in light of the 1978 amendments.
Trying to integrate the required changes into existing benefit plans while
minimizing cost increases has been the most commonly cited difficulty among
plan sponsors.6 7 Recognition of the employer's dilemma prompted the issuance
of a revised Department of Labor interpretative bulletin outlining final regulations dealing with the impact of the ADEA amendments.6 8
REGULATIONS UNDER THE ADEA

The regulations contain numerous detailed rules concerning eligibility,
participation, and accrual of benefits by employees who continue to work beyond a pension or benefit plan's normal retirement age, typically age sixty-five.
employee benefits at the normal retirement age set by the particular plan, typically 65. This
was seen as reflecting an attitude towards discouraging post-retirement age employment. Id.
65. Id. at 5.
66. See note 62 supra.
67. See JOHNsON & HIGGINS, supra note 62, at 27. Forty-seven percent of the 85 companies
surveyed responded that compliance with the ADEA amendments increased the cost of maintaining their employee benefit plans. Id. But see Senate Report, supra note 52, at 15-16. In
response to a congressional question that Labor Department stated that no cost increases
would result from the ADEA amendments. Rather, it opined that financial pressure on
pension plans could be alleviated. It reasoned that requiring an employer to permit qualified
employees to work until the Act's upper age limit would result in cost savings rather than
cost increases. Accordingly, the longer an employee works, the shorter the retirement benefits will have to be paid, thus actually lowering the funding obligations of the plan.
68. See Costs and Benefits Under Employee Benefit Plans, 29 C.F.R. §860.120 (1979).
Sections (a)(l)-(2) set out the employee benefit plan exception in section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA
and indicate the purpose of the exception to be the allowance of age-related reductions in
employee benefit plans where the reductions can be justified by significant cost considerations.
These sections also introduce the notion of cost equivalency. Where employers are justified
in reducing benefits, they may nonetheless do so only if the actual amount expended is no
less for older workers than for younger workers. See text accompanying note 78, infra.
Sections (b)-(d) defined the statutory terminology of section (4)(f)(2) of the ADEA: section
(b) defines "bona fide employee benefit plan" as a plan which accurately describes in writing
all of its terms to all employees and which actually provides the benefits in accordance with
the terms of the plan; section (c) specifies what it means "to observe the terms" of a plan.
This is defined as including only those actions, otherwise discriminatory, which are actually
prescribed by the terms of the plan. Optional provisions will not bring the plan within the
section 4(f)(2) exception. Section (d) provides that a plan will not be a "subterfuge" of the
ADEA if the lower level of benefits paid to older workers is cost justified. The section details
at great length the standards of acceptability required for employers' cost justification data.
See notes 79-80 and accompanying text, infra for further discussion of these sections.
Section (e) covers benefits provided by the government and permits employers to take
advantage of the savings achieved through government provision of certain benefits, even
though the availability of the benefits may be based on age.
Section (f) illustrates the application of the ADEA's section (4)(f)(2) exception to various
employee benefit and retirement plans.
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These regulations are the product of suggestions and compromises offered

by labor organizations, employers, and other members of the public.6 9 The
general rule reflected in the regulations is that age-based reductions in employee benefits, such as life insurance, health care, and disability plans, must
be justified by actuarially significant-o cost considerations. Underlying the cost
justification rule was the basic premise that equal costs, but not necessarily

equal benefits must be expended for workers under the protection of the Act.71
This rationale was based upon congressional recognition that the cost of providing certain benefits to older workers is greater than providing the same
benefits to younger workers.72 Requiring the delivery of equal benefits to all
workers might have discouraged employment of those in the protected class,
defeating the entire purpose of the Act.
The administration of any benefit plan presents the employer with two
choices. An employer may either reduce the premiums it pays for employee
benefits after the recipients reach age sixty-five or it may maintain the premiums paid at the pre-sixty-five level and effectively reduce the coverage of the
older participants. Neither alternative is permissible without a showing of
financially mitigating circumstances. Once such circumstances are established,
69. See Employee Benefit Plans; Amendment to Interpretative Bulletin, 44 Fed. Reg.
80648, 80649-30658 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Amend. to Interp. Bull.]. The pages
cited refer to the preamble to the interpretation of the ADEA's section 4(f)(2) which was
proposed by the Labor Department in 1979. This proposal was subsequently codified at 29
C.F.R. §860.120 (1980).
In this preamble, the Labor Department discussed several general questions that had
arisen with respect to the treatment of employee benefit plans under the ADEA. The Department then offered proposals for resolving these questions and accepted comments from
interested parties and the general public on the same issues.
70. See King County Employees' Ass'n v. State Emp. Ret. Bd., 54 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 336 P.2d
887, 891 (1959). In an action by an employees' association challenging a state retirement board's
usage of certain annuity tables in computing benefits, the court defined "actuarial equivalent"
as "a benefit of equal value when computed upon the basis of such mortality and other tables
as may be adopted by the retirement board." Id.
71. See Copperman & Rappaport, Pension and Welfare Benefits for Older Workers: The
PreliminaryImpact of the ADEA Amendments, 1980 AciNG & WoRa 75, 83 (1980); Mamorsky,
Impact of the 1978 ADEA Amendments on Employee Benefit Plans, 4 EMrPLOYEE REL. LJ. 173,
181 (1978); Ray, Age and Sex in Retirement Plans, 51 N.Y. ST. B. J. 538, 541 (1979).
72. See 118 CONG. RFc. 34750 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Randall). But see W. KENDIG, AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 51-52 (1978). The author states that the rates for health
insurance, a factor normally included in benefit plans, are "not based on age, but on marital
status, family coverage, and usage by the participants in the plan. While older workers may
be ill for longer periods of time than younger employees, this factor is largely offset by the
high maternity-benefit costs of younger employees and the insurance payments made on behalf of the children of younger employees. Hence in an organization with balanced age
groups, the hiring of older employees should not increase health insurance costs." As for life
insurance costs, the author concedes that premiums are higher for older employees. However,
he states that "since most employers have group life coverage, if an employer maintains a
balanced age distribution in his work-force his premiums would not be increased substantially
(if at all) by hiring a few more older employees." Id.
See generally AMERIcAN CouNciL op Ln INSURANCE, 1980 LxrE INSURANCE FACT BooK
(1980); R. EmzEs & R. CROWE, GRouP INSURANCE HANDBOOK (1965); J. PiCnELL, GRouP
HEALTH INsURANCE (rev. ed. 1961).
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however, the employer may, within the regulations' guidelines, 73 opt for either
course of action.
Under the ADEA regulations, the cost justification rule pertains only to
employee benefit plans providing health and insurance coverage such as those
mentioned. Retirement and pension plans, such as defined benefit 4 and defined contribution 75 plans, are free of this requirement because they are funded
differently than other benefit plans.76 Consequently, the two will be treated
separately.
Employee Benefit Plans
An employee benefit plan is one which provides employees with what are
frequently termed "fringe benefits." These typically include life insurance,
medical and dental coverage, and long-term disability protection. The employer generally absorbs all of the costs of these plans or shares the expense
proportionately with the employee.7 7 Where such plans meet the criteria of
section 4(f)(2), benefit levels for older workers may be reduced to the extent
necessary to achieve approximate equivalency in cost for younger and older
workers.7 8 The older worker may thereby receive a lesser amount of benefits or
coverage.
The regulations outline standards of acceptability for age-related cost data
proffered by an employer as justification for its plan's disparate treatment.7 9
In general, the figures or statistics relied upon must be "valid and reasonable,"
with evidence of actual costs preferred, although logical projections from similar plans are acceptable. 80 Employers have the option of making cost comparisons and adjustments by either of two approaches, the benefit-by-benefit
basis or the benefit package basis.81
Under the benefit-by-benefit approach, reductions or adjustments are made
82
according to the specific form of benefit for a specific event or contingency.
For example, higher premiums for older workers' group life insurance (the
benefit), would justify a corresponding reduction in their coverage for death
(the event). Of course, the allowance of this reduction would depend on the
73. See 29 C.F.R. §860.120(d)(l)-(4) (1980).
74. Reg. §l.401-1(b)(i)(i) (1974). See text accompanying note 97 infra.
75. Reg. §1.401-1(b)(ii), (iii) (1974). See text accompanying note 98 infra.
76. See 29 U.S.C. §§1081-1086 (1976).

77. See W. GREENOUGH

& F. KING,

supra note 3, at 176.

78. 29 C.F.R. §860.120(a)(1) (1979).
79. 29 C.F.R. §860.120(d)(l)-(3) (1979).
80. 29 C.F.R. §860.120(d)(1) (1980). For example, an employer may rely on cost data which
show the actual costs to it of providing the particular benefit in question over a representative period of years in order to meet the "valid and reasonable" standard. If such figures are
not readily available for an employer's own employees over such a period, data for a larger
group of similarly situated employees may be used. Where an employer for some reason
incurs costs significantly different from costs for a group of similarly situated employees,
however, it may not rely on the supporting data where such reliance would result in lower
benefits for its own older employees.
81. 29 C.F.R. §860.120(d)(2).
82. Id. at (d)(2)(i).
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employer's ability to demonstrate an actual cost increase. 83 However, this
method, which focuses on the individual benefit, does not permit the substitution of one entire form of benefit for another, even where both forms of benefit
8 4
are designed to provide for the same contingency. For instance, substitution
of health insurance for a long-term disability plan would be an impermissible
exchange of disability benefits.
The mechanics of the benefit-by-benefit method are best understood by
reference to more specific examples. For instance, life insurance coverage
normally remains constant up to a specified age, usually sixty-five at which time
85
either the coverage is reduced or premiums increase. Plans will not violate
the Act if they reflect the cost increase through a reduction in coverage, provided that the reduction for an employee of a particular age is consonant.
In the operation of health insurance programs the employer has available
several options under the benefit-by-benefit method. Although the cost of
medical care generally increases with age, 6 actual employer costs for employees
87
over sixty-five may actually be less due to Medicare. With respect to those
employees who are eligible for Medicare, the Act permits the employer to omit
from its own health insurance plan those benefits paid by Medicare.88 Alterna83. Id. at (a)(1).
84. See Id. at (d)(2)(i) (1980). See also Amend. to Interp. Bull., supra note 69, at 30651.
Comments received by the Labor Department while it was formulating its revised regulations
indicated uncertainty as to the precise meaning of a "benefit" under the benefit-by-benefit
approach. Some commentators appeared to believe that the Department intended a "plan-byplan" approach. Others understood the approach as meaning an "event-by-event" basis. This
would have meant that all benefits available for a particular event- death, disability, etc. would be taken together. Recognizing the ambiguity of its terminology, the Department
articulated its position that a strict view of a "benefit" would be taken. This means that an
"event-by-event" approach was specifically rejected because it would ignore the differences in
the forms available for a particular event. Consequently, it appears clear that adjustments in
benefits under the benefit-by-benefit approach must be made in the amount of the benefit,
not in its form. Id.
85. See JOHNSON & HIGGINs, supra note 62, at 7. Reduction in life insurance benefits at a
specified age is not a new policy and its practice is not forbidden by the Act. What is new,
however, are the mechanics of doing so, as imposed by the regulations. Cost-equivalent reductions, under the benefit-by-benefit approach, may be made on the basis of age and based
on average costs of providing the benefits over a maximum age bracket of five years. The
approach taken by most employers is either a yearly eight percent reduction starting at age
65 or a one time 35 percent reduction for the five-year bracket from ages 65-70. This method
is specifically provided for in the Labor Department regulations in 29 C.F.X. §860.120 (1979).
The Johnson and Higgins survey was based on responses from 85 Fortune-ranked companies questioned during December, 1979. Surprisingly, a bare majority-50.6%- of those
surveyed did not reduce group life insurance benefits for active employees before age 70. Of
those that did, however, 88% began the reductions at age 65. See JOHNSON & HIGGINS, supra
note 62, at 8.
See also Copperman & Rappaport, supra note 71, at 83-84. The findings of this survey indicated that the provision of life insurance benefits was significantly related to firm size. Generally, the larger the firm, the more likely life insurance coverage continued.
86. See COMMaRCE CLEARING HousE, INC., supra note 7, at 212-13.
87. 42 U.S.C. §§1395-1396(i) (1976).
88. See 29 C.F.R. §860.120(f)(1)(ii)(A)(B)(C) (1980). With respect to those employees eligible
for Medicare, an employer may "carve out" from its health insurance plan any benefits
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tively, the employer may insure employees eligible for Medicare under a
separate supplemental plan. The benefits provided, however, must be no less
favorable to the employee than those he would receive under the employer's
regular plan.8 9 A rather obvious question arises: because Medicare may result
in a significant cost savings to the employer, should the Act provide that the
savings be passed on to the employee in the form of extra benefits? It is certainly arguable that the employee and not the employer should benefit from
Medicare. Moreover, the additional benefits received would be going to the
employee when they are most needed. The ADEA, however, sought only to
equalize treatment between older and younger workers. Therefore, it would be
beyond the scope of the Act to make affirmative demands on an employer where
the entire existence of the benefit plan is itself purely voluntary.
The employer's other option in its delivery of employee benefits is the
benefit package approach. This method offers greater flexibility than does the
individual benefit approach because adjustments are determined by looking at
the plan in its entirety. Benefits in one area may be altered more than those in
another, provided the plan's overall compliance with the ADEA remains unaffected. 90 This will generally operate in favor of the individual employee because the Act permits him to select which benefits will be adjusted. Furthermore, the regulations provide a safeguard as the benefit package will only be
in compliance with the Act when neither the cost of benefits to the employer
nor the favorability of the overall benefits to the employee are reduced by its
operation. 91 For example, assume that two benefits are available to employees
wherein age-based cost increases would justify a ten percent decrease in both
benefits if the benefit-by-benefit basis were utilized. With the package approach,
actually paid for by Medicare. However, an employer may not assume that employees eligible
for Medicare have in fact taken advantage of the available coverage. To benefit from Medicare
coverage, the employer must inform each eligible employee of the need to apply for coverage
and must provide any necessary assistance for making application for Medicare benefits.
Because of the savings to employers that result from Medicare, reductions in health benefits
for employees between 65 and 70 will usually not be justified. Id.
89. Id. Furthermore, the cost to the employer for the supplemental plan may not be less
than the cost which would be expended to include Medicare-covered employees in the regular
health plan.
90. See Amend. to Interp. Bull., supra note 69, at 30656-57. Part of the reason for allowing the benefit package approach was to aid employers and workers in finding ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment. Consequently, in order to assure
that this approach is being used to the advantage of older workers, certain limitations were
placed on its use. First, a benefit package approach may apply only to employee benefit plans
which fall under section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA. Thus, uninsured paid sick leave or paid vacation plans are not involved here. Second, this approach may not apply to retirement or
pension plans. Even though they fall under section 4(f)(2), these plans are subject to different
rules than other employee benefit plans. See note 76 supra. Third, the package approach will
not justify health benefit reductions greater than would be justified under the benefit-bybenefit approach. Finally, a reduction in other benefits greater than that which would be
justified under a benefit-by-benefit approach must be offset by another benefit that is available
to the same employees. Thus, greater reductions in one area are permissible, provided the
employees affected have the opportunity to replace the reduced benefits with other benefits.
91. See 29 C.F.R. §860.120(f)(2) (1980).
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one benefit and
employees would have the option of choosing not to reduce
92
other.
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reduction
percent
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The general rule with regard to employee benefit adjustments, then, is that
reductions in older employees' benefits are permissible upon a demonstration

of cost justification and cost equivalency.93 As noted earlier, 94 retirement and
pension plans are exceptions to this rule.
PensionandRetirement Plans

There are two basic types of retirement plans, the defined benefit plan95
and the defined contribution plan.96 The former refers to a plan which specifies
that fixed benefits are payable at retirement irrespective of profits. 97 Contributions to such a plan are determined actuarially. In contrast, a defined contribution plan involves an individual account for each participant into which proceeds from profit-sharing, investments, forfeitures, etc., are paid according to
specified formulas.9 The rules governing the creation and application of these
formulas are embodied in very complex provisions of ERISA. 99 The rules governing other employee benefit plans such as those discussed earlier,10 0 however,
are set out in the regulations under the ADEA. The result is that the two different types of plans covered by section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA are each subject
to varied sets of regulations. Thus, conflicts between ERISA and the 1978
amendments to the ADEA may exist. For example, extension of the ADEA's
age limit to seventy-five years may require a change in an employer's retirement benefit calculation, which would be forbidden by ERISA. Congressional
sponsors of the amendment recognized the potential for this type of problem
and consequently sought administrative opinions on the question. In 1978,
both the ADEA and ERISA came under the enforcement jurisdiction of the
0
and accordingly, that office was asked to issue a stateLabor Department, 11
92. This trade-off of benefits is perfectly lawful under the ADEA. The details of the trade,
however, depend on the actual costs to the employer of the two benefits. For example, if cost
data show that the two benefits cost the same, the 20% reduction in one is permissible. However, if one benefit costs only half as much as the other, it may be reduced up to only 15%
if the other is unreduced. See 29 C.F.R. §860.120()(2)(v) (1979).
93. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
94. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
95. See'note 74 supra and 97 infra.
96. See note 75 supra and 98 infra.
97. See W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, supra note 3, at 178-89. Under most private pension
plans the pension commitment is defined in terms of plan output, in other words, a definition
of the benefit. The amount of this benefit is stated by formula and the formula is applied for
each plan participant upon his or her retirement. The pension obligation created by the
formula for all participants combined becomes the base for the actuarial calculation of the
plan's liabilities and funding requirements.
98. Id. at 176-78. In defined contribution plans, the pension commitment is specified in
terms of input to the plan. The regular contribution of the employer to the pension plan is
stated as a percentage of the current compensation of the plan participant. This amount is
then credited to an individual account on behalf of each participant.
99. See notes 10 and 76 supra.
100. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
101. Administration of the ADEA was subsequently transferred to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See note 132 infra.
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ment regarding the effect of a revised ADEA on ERISA. 1° ? The Labor Department's conclusion in five specific areas of concern was that no conflicts were
03
anticipated.
The first of these issues was whether an employer would be required to
credit an employee's years of service after normal retirement age for purposes
of benefit accrual.104 The Labor Department's response was that nothing in
either ADEA or ERISA would require such credit. 05 The second question was
whether an employer would be required to pay an actuarial equivalent' 016 of
normal retirement benefits to an employee who continued to work beyond the
normal retirement age.' 0 7 The Department stated that no adjustment in the
size of the employee's periodic payments at the time he actually retired would
be necessary. 08 Both ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code specifically cover
this situation.109 The third question was whether a pension plan which pro-

vided for the commencement of retirement benefits at age sixty-five could be
amended to allow the start of benefits only at the date of actual retirement
without violating ADEA or ERISA." 0 The Department's response was that
102. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 13-14. A letter was addressed to Donald Eusburg, Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards, U.S. Department of Labor, from Senators
Williams and Javits of the Senate Human Resources Committee. The Committee was concerned about ADEA-ERISA conflicts and sought a written opinion addressing that issue.
103. Id. at 14.
104. Id. An employee's final retirement benefit is calculated according to a formula determined by the sponsor of the particular retirement plan. Rates of payment will of course
vary among plans. All plan formulas, however, are based on certain factors, namely, an employee's age, an employee's years of service with the employer, and a percentage of the employee's compensation. See COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE INC., PENSION REFORM ACT OF 1974,
LAW AND EXPLANATION 14-17 (1974). Service credit normally ceases when an employee reaches
65. The question was thus whether the extension of the ADEA's protected age limit to 70
would require credit until age 70.
105. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 15. The Labor Department response did note,
however, that there is a section in ERISA (section 204) which limits the extent to which a
plan may provide for a higher rate of benefit accrual during later, and presumably higher
paid, years of service. This provision sets forth three alternative tests. A plan must meet one
of these tests in order to demonstrate proper benefit accrual.
106. See note 70 supra. See Bompey, supra note 56, at 223-24. "Actuarial equivalent"
refers to the result of adjustments which are designed to "produce a benefit of equivalent
value after considering changes in the circumstances surrounding the payment of that benefit." The purpose of this type of adjustment was explained: "An upward actuarial adjustment
in the monthly lifetime benefit to be paid to a plan participant who retires after his or her
normal retirement age is designed to take account of the fact that such benefit is likely to be
paid over a shorter period of time. The cost impact of such an adjustment is that the plan,
and, accordingly, the sponsoring employer, does not derive the fortuitous benefit it might
otherwise gain from the reduced pay out period." Id.
107. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 14.

108. Id. See also COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., supra note 104, at 324. In the HouseSenate Conference Committee's joint explanation on section 204 of ERISA, it was stated that
"[n]o actuarial adjustment of the accrued benefit would be required, however, if the employee voluntarily postponed his own retirement. For example, if the plan provided a benefit
of $400 a month payable at age 65, this same $400 a month benefit (with no upward adjustment) could also be paid by the plan who voluntarily retired at age 68." Id.
109.
110.

29 U.S.C. §1054 (1974); Treas. Reg. §§l.41l(c)-l(f)(2 ) (1974).
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 14.
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most plans already condition benefit payment on actual retirement.""- Accordingly, amendment of most plans would be unnecessary. Any plan which
provided for payment at a date other than normal retirement age, however,
2
could be amended without violating either act."1 The fourth issue concerned

the probability of increased funding costs for pension plans if the upper age
limit of the ADEA were extended."13 According to the Labor Department, no
increase in cost would be experienced; rather, financial pressure on plans could
be alleviated."- Finally, the Department was asked whether an employer's
failure to provide for the accrual of benefits for an employee working beyond
normal retirement age would constitute age discrimination under the ADEA,
even if ERISA did not require those accruals.:" 5 The Department stated that
requiring a plan to provide benefit accrual after the plan's normal retirement
it concluded that
age would run counter to the purpose of the Act.116 Thus,
1
there would be no violation of the ADEA in that instance. '
Defined Benefit Plans
An employer maintaining a defined benefit retirement plan remained relatively unaffected by the changes in the ADEA, as no employer is required to
provide such a plan for his employees. Congress sought to avoid the imposition
of strict regulations which might discourage employers from continuing their
plans."18 Consequently, under the current regulations:
1) An employer is not required by either the ADEA or ERISA to credit
years of service completed after normal retirement age when calculating a final
benefit.- 0
2) An employer will not be required to increase the amount of the pension
of benefits when an employee works
to reflect the delay in commencement
20
beyond the normal retirement age.
111. Id. Neither ADEA nor ERISA require the payment of retirement benefits to employees who continue to work beyond normal retirement age or on the actual date of retirement whichever is later. See 29 U.S.C. §1056 (1974).
112. See SENATE REPORT, supranote 52, at 15.
113. Id. at 14.
114. The Labor Department noted that "as an actuarial matter, the longer an employee
works, the shorter the period retirement payments will have to be made, thus lowering the
funding assumptions of the plan. Savings would of course come from the added years of
accumulated interest on the fund. Savings would also stem from the fact that... a plan need
not provide for further accrual of benefits after the participant has reached the plan's normal
retirement age, and thus the added years of service do not increase the ultimate xetirement
benefit or the cost of providing it." Id. at 16.
115. Id. at 14.
116. Id. at 16. The Labor Department based its belief on its reading of the ADEA's
legislative history. According to its interpretation, the section 4(f)(2) pension plan exception
was intended to allow age to be considered in funding a plan and in determining the level of
benefits to be paid.
117. Id. This dialogue was subsequently formalized into the Interpretative Bulletin mentioned earlier, see note 68 supra, which more fully outlined the employer's duties with respect to both defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans.
118. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 52, at 5.
119. 29 C.F.R. §860.120(t)(iv)(B)(3) (1979).

120. Id. at (B)(4).
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3) An employer may amend its plan to provide that retirement benefits
than at normal
will not commence until the actual date of retirement, rather
121
retirement age for employees who choose to work longer.
4) An employer need not take into account salary increases and benefit
improvements under the plan which take place after an employee reaches
2
normal retirement age.1 2
Although this freezing of pension benefits is permitted by the regulations
and appears to be consistent with the legislative history of the ADEA, it is not
reconcilable with the rationale underlying pension design generally. The
purpose of a defined benefit plan is to replace income lost because of retirement. 123 Freezing pension benefits ignores the fact that the need for an income
substitute created by an individual's departure from the work force is not
necessarily causally related to the age at which he retires. Regardless of actual
retirement age, a retiree will still be faced with the necessity of replacing lost
earnings. Therefore, the freezing of pension benefits at a certain age is illogical
and antithetical to the basic purpose of the pension system. A pension is a
reflection of the performance and length of service which an individual has
contributed to his employer. Consequently, an employer's financial arguments
for the freezing or reduction of retirement benefits are less tenable than in the
case of other employee benefits where the employer voluntarily assumes full
pecuniary responsibility for providing them. The denial of benefits beyond a
set age also destroys any incentive for job achievement by older employees
because superior performance does not result in any financial reward. Moreover, this approach is extremely inequitable in its failure to take into account
the impact of inflation 24on the retiree whose monthly pension check is often his
only source of income.1
Defined ContributionPlans
Unlike a defined benefit plan, the funding of a retirement plan by defined
25
contributions is not affected by the age of an employee." In a defined contribution plan, the employer does not have to provide funding for a specific
level of benefits, and the benefit received by an employee at retirement depends
26
only upon the value of the contributions made on his behalf.1 Therefore, age
121.

Id. at (B)(6).

122. Id. at (B)(7).
123. See Copperman & Rappaport, supra note 71, at 78. The authors take the position
that the freezing of benefits at a certain age is unjustified because it goes against the purpose
of a pension plan. This purpose is to provide retirement income. When benefits are frozen,
retirement income needs will not be fully met, frustrating the entire goal of the plan. See
also American Attitudes Toward Pensions and Retirement: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Aging, House of Reps., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1979).
124. Unlike Social Security payments, private pension benefits rarely provide cost-of-living
adjustments. See Munnell, The Impact of Inflation on Private Pensions, 1979 NEW ENGLAND
ECON. REV. 18, 19. See generally Energy Costs and Inflation: the Impact of the Elderly: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Consumer Interests of the House Select Comm.
on Aging, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
125. See note 98 supra. Because the contribution is generally based on a percentage of
the employee's salary, age is not a factor in funding this type of plan.
126. See [1977] 2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 115022. This statement was included in an
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does not affect the level of an employer's contributions as it does in a defined
benefit plan. Accordingly, the exclusion of a newly-hired older worker from a
defined contribution plan would be much harder to justify than in the case of
a defined benefit plan, since with the former there is no persuasive evidence
that a continuation of such a benefit to older employees would impose an unreasonable economic burden on the employer.127 Nonetheless, the Labor Department regulations do allow employers to cease their contributions to any
partidpant in a defined contribution plan after he has reached the normal
retirement age.1 28 Additionally, defined contribution plans may completely exclude participation by an employee hired after the normal retirement age. 29
The type of contributions made by the employer may, however, be dispositive of the type of treatment of older workers permissible under these plans.
For example, some plans allocate investment gains and losses, employee
termination forfeitures, and profit-sharing to individual employee accounts
instead of using these amounts to reduce the figure defined as the employer's
contribution. 30Where this is the case, no disparate treatment of older workers
is permitted and allocations must be made equally to all employees regardless
of whether they are over the normal retirement age. 31 This is the most equitable approach because age has no bearing on the amounts of these allocations.
ANALYSIS OF LABOR DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS

Since administration of the ADEA was transferred from the Labor Department to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 1979,182
the Commission has been attempting to revise, and in some cases revoke, the
Department's regulations and interpretations of the Act.233 Faced with a difOpinion Letter from the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department
of Labor. The letter was the Department's response to a question from an individual asking
whether employees hired while in the 40 to 65 age group could be lawfully excluded from
participation in their employer's pension or retirement plan. The opinion subsequently concluded that the exclusion of a newly-hired older worker from a defined contribution plan
would be a violation of the ADEA. Cf. 29 C.F.R. §860.120(f)(iv)(B)(1) (1979) (defined contribution plan may provide for the cessation of contributions after the normal retirement age
of any participant in the plan. Moreover, such a plan may completely exclude from participation those employees hired after normal retirement age).
127. See Mamorsky, supra note 71, at 180. The author noted that his conclusion was consistent with the rationale of the Labor Department as expressed in its Opinion Letter, supra
note 126.
128. 29 C.F.R. §860.120(f)(iv)(B)(1) (1980).
129. Id. The regulations, however, apply only with respect to those defined contribution
plans which are not "supplemental" plans. A plan will be deemed "supplemental" if an
employee is a participant in it as well as in a defined benefit plan maintained by the same
employer. No employee, regardless of age, may be excluded from a "supplemental" plan. The
rationale behind this xule is that age is never a factor in such a plan, because the funds in
the plan are acquired from sources like profits, investments, etc.
130. See 29 C.F.R. §860.120(f)(iv)(B)(2) (1979).
181. Id.
132. See Reorg. Plan. No. 1 of 1978, §2,43 Fed. Reg. 19807.
133. See Statement of Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Before the House Select Committee on Aging 17-22 (June 18, 1980)
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ferent constituency"3 than the Labor Department, the EEOC's policy judgments generally reflect a stronger enforcement stance in employment discrimination matters. Accordingly, the Commission expressed particular interest
in re-examining an employer's obligation to continue providing pension and
13 5
other employee benefits to employees over sixty-five years of age. The EEOC's
position is that the Labor Department regulations allowing cessation of benefits upon normal retirement age created a windfall for employers by requiring
neither that they continue paying into retirement funds nor that they provide
alternate forms of compensation.136
In an effort to remedy what it saw as an indefensible interpretation of the
ADEA by the Labor Department, the EEOC circulated its own proposal for
comment by the Labor Department, the Internal Revenue Service, and the
President's Commission on Pension Policy. 37 This proposal would require
138
It
continued contributions and. accruals of benefits beyond age sixty-five.
would also treat pension plans similarly to employee benefit plans in that employers would be forced to continue to provide benefits to employees between
the ages of sixty-five and seventy. 39 All practices formerly permissible under
the Labor Department regulations would now constitute violations of the
Act.'

40

The EEOC's justification for this drastic revamping of private pension
practices rested on a new interpretation of the legislative history of the ADEA
which discerned a congressional intent to forbid cessation of benefit expendi[hereinafter referred to as Norton Statement] (to be reprinted in EEOC Enforcement of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980)). This hearing was called in the face of allegations about the
Commission's effectiveness and the seriousness with which it regards its mandate under the
ADEA. Id. (statement of Aging Committee Chairman Claude Pepper).
134. Pursuant to President Carter's Reorganization Plan of 1978, supra note 215, the
EEOC became the "principal Federal agency in fair employment enforcement." See Letter of
President Carter transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978 to the Congress (February
23, 1978) (reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ACE DisCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 80 (1978)). The EEOC thus has enforcement power over Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, the ADEA, the Equal Pay Act, and over antidiscrimination
policies concerning Federal employees, formerly handled by the Civil Service Commission.
135. See Norton Statement, supra note 133, at 19. The EEOC has approved interim
interpretative regulations reflecting the statutory changes made in 1974. See 44 Fed. Reg.
68858 (1979).
136. See Norton Statement, supra note 133, at 19.
137. See [1980] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-12 (May 15, 1980).
138. See M. Siegel & C. Buckmann, EEOC Proposes to Alter Age-Bias Bulletin, N.Y.L.J.
Daily, June 9, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
139. Id.
140. For example, employers would no longer be able to exclude employees hired within
five years of normal retirement age from defined benefit plans. Participants in profit-sharing
and other defined contribution plans would be required to be given allocations of employer
contributions through age 70 on the theory that there is no cost justification for discontinuing
contributions at any age to such plans. If a participant in a defined benefit plan continued
to work beyond normal retirement age, his or her accrued benefit would have to be adjusted
by either increasing it actuarially to reflect the retention of funds by the plan or crediting
service and salary after normal retirement age. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 4

1981]

AGE DISCRIMINATION

tures on behalf of post-age-sixty-five plan participants.14 According to the Commission, Congress believed that continuing benefit accruals and contributions
past the age of sixty-five would be unnecessary only where the individual employees involved already were assured of a reasonable pension benefit. 42 The
Commission's focus was thus, laudably, on the financial position of the retiree.
The concern was perfectly understandable because, under the current regula-

tions, an employee continuing past the age of sixty-five is in effect working
only for the difference between his salary and the pension he would be receiving if he had retired at sixty-five.143 There is no logical or equitable justification for distinguishing treatment of deferred retirees under pension plans from
their treatment under other employee benefit plans, or for eliminating additional pension credit at age sixty-five. This conclusion is supported by the
language of the Act itself, as the ADEA in no way differentiates between pen44
sion and employee benefit plans.
Nonetheless, the EEOC's position has been strongly criticized as a usurpation of the legislative role of Congress by an administrative agency. 45 Although
this may be an overly harsh criticism, it is not without merit because the
legislative history analysis upon which the EEOC's proposal is based draws no
support from other sources. 46 The body of statements and opinions comprising
the ADEA's history are well known, well publicized, and relatively unambiguous, yet the EEOC's position has never before been taken.
The EEOC's suggested proposal is designed to respond to what it perceives
to be a difficult situation. The provisions of the Labor Department regulations
relating to pension plans are inequitable and are not mandated by the language of the ADEA. Indeed, in terms of their effect on older employees, the
regulations seem to be more of a departure from the statutory objectives than
a reflection of them. The Act's legislative history, however, compels the conclusion that Congress did not attempt to mandate costly departures from longstanding pension practices. Support for the original ADEA would not have
been so pronounced if it had been intended to regulate the maintenance of
private benefit and pension plans so strictly.
Although the Commission's approach appears in many ways to be more
reflective of true statutory intent and purpose than is the Labor Department's,
its higlfdy divergent course makes it untenable as a matter of law. 47 In view of
141. See M. Siegel &C. Buckmann, supranote 188, at 15, col. 4.
142. Id.
143. In other words, an employe working past age 65 ceases to receive pension credit for
salary increases instituted after his 65th birthday as well as additional pension credit for
whatever post-65 years he works.
144. See 29 U.S.C. §623(f(2) (1976 &Supp. 1I 1979).
145. See M. Siegel & C. Buckmann, supra note 138, at 15, col. 5, [1980] DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), supra note 137, at A-11 (citing letter from John A. Connors, chief executive partner
of Kwasha Lipton, consulting actuaries).
146. See M. Siegel & C. Buckmann, supra note 138, at 1, col. I. The original legislative
history analysis undertaken by the Labor Department in its regulations was the definitive
interpretation according to most observers in the area.
147. Rules or regulations, such as those involved here, which are promulgated by an executive branch or agency are merely interpretative and .- s uch are not accorded the force of
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the importance of the issues involved, it is preferable that any changes of this
scope be accomplished by statutory amendment rather than by administrative
decision. The Labor Department obviously concurs in this view, since it has
vehemently disagreed with the EEOC's proposed action. In a letter to EEOC
Chair Elenor Holmes Norton, former Secretary of Labor Marshall sharply
disputed the Commission's analysis of the ADEA's legislative history. 148 Secretary Marshall reasserted the Labor Department's position that the proposed
EEOC interpretation contravenes both the ADEA and ERISA. 149 The letter
also recommended that the two agencies reach agreement on an historical interpretation of the ADEA amendments before any proposal was published in the
Federal Register. 150 Although, the EEOC is apparently reconsidering its position, a formal vote on the proposal has been postponed indefinitely.15'
CONCLUSION

The bitter dispute between present and former administrators of the ADEA
emphasizes the need for immediate congressional involvement in this area. The
contingencies provided for in the Labor Department's regulations are complex
and too confusing to be adequately treated by an executive Department or an
administrative agency. Reliance on the courts would also be undesirable152
Congress should reconsider the entire area of employee benefits under the
ADEA by analyzing both the Labor Department's and the EEOC's proposals.
Then, swift legislative adoption of an approved interpretation should be made
in the form of amendments to the ADEA itself.
A compromise between the approaches of the Labor Department and the
EEOC would be the most appropriate course of action. As a first step in this
direction, Congress should again amend section 4(f)(2) to make separate provision for pension and employee benefit plans. This would emphasize the
law. See 29 C.F.R. §860.1 (1980). Such rulemaking is subject to review by the courts which
may substitute their own judgment as to the content or effect of the rules. See generally
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944); Davis, ADM. LAW & GOV'T 119 (1975, ed.).
148. See CALLAGHAN & CO., 4 EQUAL EMPL. COMPL. UPDATE 25 (November, 1980). The
EEOC Commissioners were scheduled to take a formal vote on the matter of their revised
regulations in late October of 1980. This meeting had been postponed several times during
the months of August and September. Interview with Arlene Shadoan, Special Assistant to
EEOC Chair Norton, in Washington, D.C. (September 3, 1980). The scheduled meeting,
however, has been postponed indefinitely as a result of Secretary of Labor Marshall's letter
addressed to EEOC Chair Norton. The Secretary's letter expressed sharp disagreement with
the EEOC's analysis of the ADEA's legislative history. He asserted that the EEOC interpretation is contrary to both the ADEA and ERISA.
149. Id. The Secretary pointed out that ERISA was a carefully balanced statute which
took into account both the rights of employees and the incentives to employers. It sought to
avoid the risk that federal regulation would be so complex and expensive for employers that
they would cease to sponsor pension plans altogether. Consequently, when Congress was considering the 1978 ADEA amendments, it was careful to make clear that the amendments would
not require that additional pension benefits, accruals, or actuarial adjustments be made by
employers other than those already required by ERISA.
150. Id.
151. Id. See note 148 supra.
152. See note 147 supra.
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distinction between these types of plans and clarify the fact that different rules
pertain to each. As a second step, a new provision should be adopted, which
would relate solely to pension plans and would provide for benefit accruals
past the age of sixty-five. A fair reading of the legislative history seems to require that much. Nevertheless, if Congress did not intend to go that far, an
exception, such as the cost justification rule used in employee benefit plans,
should be provided for pension plans as well. Plan sponsors would thus bear
the burden of demonstrating significant cost increases to justify an exception
from the rule. This would provide relief only where truly needed, because
deferred retirements usually result in cost savings to a plan.153 Finally, whatever
Congress decides, it should attempt to make its intention clearer than it has in
the past. Not only must the statutory language be specific, but the discussion
and reports of amendments should evidence an identifiable legislative intent.
Only when employers and employees alike are fully apprised of their rights
and duties under the ADEA will post-retirement age employment be a viable
option for workers.
PATRICIA A. MA~rnN
153.

See note 67 supra.
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